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U.S. primacy in the face of chronic economic challenges.
These issues are featured in assessments
of three alternative national security
strategies. The first alternative, “U.S.
Dominance and Preventive Action,” is
embraced by neoconservatives and
those within the administration and
elsewhere who have been referred to as
“assertive nationalists.” It begins with
the premise that “the most serious
threats to American security come from
the combination of terrorism, rogue
states, and weapons of mass destruction.” The capability and will to act preemptively and unilaterally are essential;
American military dominance must be
maintained; and U.S. security requires
widespread democracy and capitalism.
The second option, “A More Stable
World with U.S. Power for Deterrence
and Containment,” is said to be favored
by moderate Republicans and Democrats. They share the characterization of
the threat provided by advocates of option one, yet counsel against elevating
“preemption” to the status of a doctrine, emphasize the need for international support in the ongoing war on
terror, and warn against the strategic
overextension that may well result from
proactively spreading free-market
democracies.
The distinctly liberal third option, “A
Cooperative World Order,” is reminiscent of the Clinton administration’s national security strategy—“Engagement
and Enlargement,” in Anthony Lake’s
formulation. To the nexus of terrorists, rogue states, and weapons of mass
destruction, its proponents add the
longer-term threats posed by “global
poverty, growing lawlessness, and the
increasing isolation of the United
States from like-minded states.” This
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multitude of dangers requires
international diplomatic, economic,
and military cooperation; military responses are not to be given pride of
place. The United States must
strengthen, not tear asunder, international norms and institutions. Even the
world’s dominant military power cannot unilaterally ensure its security.
Korb masterfully translates the three alternatives into full-blown presidential
addresses to Congress and the nation.
He also systematically and evenhandedly assesses the strengths, weaknesses,
and political impact of each. Significantly, “liberal,” for Korb, is not a
four-letter word. Unlike many Republicans, he knows how to count. This volume should be required reading for
President George W. Bush, his advisers,
and the broader U.S. national security
community.
ANDREW L. ROSS

Naval War College

Scarborough, Rowan. Rumsfeld’s War. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004. 253pp. $27.95

Rumsfeld’s War is a close-up look at one
of the most influential figures in the
Bush administration, and a key leader
in the current war against militant
Islamism. The book examines Rumsfeld
the man, reviewing his long and varied
career at the top levels of government
and industry, and analyzes his role in
the two principal themes of his tenure,
transformation of the Cold War military and defeat of Middle Eastern
terrorism.
Rowan Scarborough is a well known
Washington Times reporter, specializing
in defense issues. While not a panegyric,
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his book provides a sympathetic look at
Rumsfeld. This is not surprising, in that
the Washington Times has been notably
supportive of the Bush administration.
As in his reporting, when writing his
book, Scarborough doubtless benefited
from close and frequent contact with
the senior people around the secretary
of defense.
One characteristic of Donald Rumsfeld
that leaps from the pages is his utter
self-assurance, bordering on arrogance,
which manifests itself as remarkable decisiveness and precision in thought and
speech. The book opens with Rumsfeld’s
conversation with President Bush soon
after American Airlines flight 77
crashed into the Pentagon. He is noted
as saying, “This is not a criminal action,
this is war.” His phrase crystalized a
radical shift in strategic thinking that
decisively took America from the listless strategic drift of the 1990s to one of
activism and intervention. As noted by
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith, “That was really a breakthrough strategically and intellectually.
Viewing the 9/11 attacks as a war that
required a war strategy was a very big
thought and a lot flowed from that.”
The twin themes of transformation and
fighting wars are inextricably intertwined. Serving as secretary of defense
for President Gerald Ford from 1975 to
1977, Rumsfeld returned to the White
House a second time with a specific
mandate from President Bush to
“transform” the military—bring strategy and military capabilities into better
balance with the post–Cold War
geopolitical context. The Bush administration came into office believing that
the Pentagon was too wedded to expensive, obsolescing systems from the Cold
War and to the accompanying policies,

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/17

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer_Autumn 2004.vp
Tuesday, September 28, 2004 12:26:48 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

157

processes, and mind-set that demanded
more of the same. When Rumsfeld aggressively set out to overturn the tables
in the Pentagon, he was met with determined resistance, for both substantive
and stylistic reasons. By early September 2001, there were widespread rumors that Rumsfeld would be the first
cabinet secretary to resign, over his inability to foster change in the Pentagon.
Flight 77 changed all that. The United
States was no longer chasing criminals,
it was at war. The operations in Afghanistan were dominated by remarkable
synergies between special operations
forces and precision weapons, themes
that had long been pushed by “transformation” advocates. In both Afghanistan
and Iraq, Rumsfeld insisted on far
smaller numbers of ground combat
units than the military leadership was
comfortable with, arguing that the synergies possible in a heavily netted joint
battle space, coupled with precision
weapons and targeting, greatly increased the lethality and effectiveness of
U.S. forces. The combat results amply
repaid his confidence.
The lessons from the fighting merely redoubled Rumsfeld’s determination to
keep transforming the Department of
Defense. Battlefield results notwithstanding, change in the military bureaucratic processes remained difficult.
Rumsfeld noted that he “was struck by . . .
how resistant people are to looking at
strategy in a different way and pursuing
advantages, rather than focusing on reacting to threats.” On the other hand,
his often abrasive manner needlessly
antagonized people otherwise willing to
help bring about overdue change in the
Pentagon.
There is no doubt, however, that
Rumsfeld has made an enormous effort
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to overcome the stultifying stasis of the
huge Department of Defense bureaucracies—military and civilian—and the
mental inertia of fifty years of Cold War
thinking. As Scarborough notes,
“Rumsfeld’s task of reconfiguring the
military and fighting the war on terror
is so immense that it will take the light
of history to determine exactly what he
finally accomplished and at what he
failed.” If nothing else, Rumsfeld created, if not institutionalized, the state of
intellectual ferment that antecedes major change in any large organization.
Rumsfeld’s War is a quick, instructive
read from a pro-Rumsfeld perspective.
In that sense, it perhaps could be considered a counter to Bob Woodward’s
two recent “insider” books on the current war, for which Woodward received
very little support from Rumsfeld, and
in which Rumsfeld is not sympathetically depicted. On the downside, the
book stylistically feels somewhat as if
the author threw together some of his
day-to-day reporting text and called it a
book. Also, fully one-third of the book
consists of appendices, with copies of
various memos and papers, many classified “secret”; no military reader can
applaud the open use of such documents. However, the book is an interesting depiction of a remarkable man.
As Scarborough notes on the final
page, “It is hard to imagine any other
man to whom Bush could have turned
to fight this war with more tenacity,
panache, and, at the appropriate time,
good humor.”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy
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Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Art of War. Edited and
translated by Christopher Lynch. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2003. 262pp. $25

Machiavelli’s classic, if now rarely read,
The Art of War was probably the single
most popular military treatise in Europe prior to Jomini—Clausewitz was a
professed admirer.
At first sight, this book, with its apparent attempt to revive the infantrycentered military organization of the
imperial Roman legions, seems hopelessly irrelevant to present concerns.
Even within its historical setting (it was
originally published in 1521),
Machiavelli’s work is often dismissed
today for its alleged failure to appreciate the social and technological
trends—particularly the growing importance of gunpowder—underpinning
the “revolution in military affairs” of
the sixteenth century. Christopher
Lynch makes an excellent case that such
interpretations neglect the literary or
rhetorical dimension of The Art of War
and its relationship to Machiavelli’s
larger intellectual project. In an extensive introduction, as well as an interpretive essay, Lynch rebuts the criticisms of
contemporary scholars, defends
Machiavelli’s grasp of the military realities of his own day, and reinterprets the
intention of the work in relation to
Machiavelli’s more famous political treatises, The Prince and Discourses on Livy.
Lynch’s key point is that Machiavelli
was not simply the backward-looking
admirer of Rome he is often taken to be
but a revolutionary thinker who combined elements of past military and political systems in a novel synthesis. His
apparent reliance on Roman models is
to be understood fundamentally as a
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